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tcp: Don't drop SYN+ACK for simultaneous connect().

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[ Upstream commit 23e89e8ee7be73e21200947885a6d3a109a2c58d ]

RFC 9293 states that in the case of simultaneous connect(), the connection
gets established when SYN+ACK is received. [0]

      TCP Peer A                                       TCP Peer B

  1.  CLOSED                                           CLOSED
  2.  SYN-SENT     --> <SEQ=100><CTL=SYN>              ...
  3.  SYN-RECEIVED <-- <SEQ=300><CTL=SYN>              <-- SYN-SENT
  4.               ... <SEQ=100><CTL=SYN>              --> SYN-RECEIVED
  5.  SYN-RECEIVED --> <SEQ=100><ACK=301><CTL=SYN,ACK> ...
  6.  ESTABLISHED  <-- <SEQ=300><ACK=101><CTL=SYN,ACK> <-- SYN-RECEIVED
  7.               ... <SEQ=100><ACK=301><CTL=SYN,ACK> --> ESTABLISHED

However, since commit 0c24604b68 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 4.2"), such a
SYN+ACK is dropped in tcp_validate_incoming() and responded with Challenge
ACK.

For example, the write() syscall in the following packetdrill script fails
with -EAGAIN, and wrong SNMP stats get incremented.

   0 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_NONBLOCK, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3
  +0 connect(3, ..., ...) = -1 EINPROGRESS (Operation now in progress)

  +0 > S  0:0(0) <mss 1460,sackOK,TS val 1000 ecr 0,nop,wscale 8>
  +0 < S  0:0(0) win 1000 <mss 1000>
  +0 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 <mss 1460,sackOK,TS val 3308134035 ecr 0,nop,wscale 8>
  +0 < S. 0:0(0) ack 1 win 1000

  +0 write(3, ..., 100) = 100
  +0 > P. 1:101(100) ack 1

  --

  # packetdrill cross-synack.pkt
  cross-synack.pkt:13: runtime error in write call: Expected result 100 but got -1 with errno 11 (Resource temporarily unavailable)
  # nstat
  ...
  TcpExtTCPChallengeACK           1                  0.0
  TcpExtTCPSYNChallenge           1                  0.0

The problem is that bpf_skops_established() is triggered by the Challenge
ACK instead of SYN+ACK.  This causes the bpf prog to miss the chance to
check if the peer supports a TCP option that is expected to be exchanged
in SYN and SYN+ACK.

Let's accept a bare SYN+ACK for active-open TCP_SYN_RECV sockets to avoid
such a situation.

Note that tcp_ack_snd_check() in tcp_rcv_state_process() is skipped not to
send an unnecessary ACK, but this could be a bit risky for net.git, so this
targets for net-next.

Link: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293.html#section-3.5-7 [0]
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240710171246.87533-2-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Kuniyuki Iwashima 2024-07-10 10:12:45 -07:00 • committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 78c6e39fef
commit 9fd2973837
1 changed files with 9 additions and 0 deletions
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9
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
View file

@ -5880,6 +5880,11 @@ static bool tcp_validate_incoming(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
* RFC 5961 4.2 : Send a challenge ack
*/
if (th->syn) {
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_RECV && sk->sk_socket && th->ack &&
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1 == TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq &&
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1 == tp->rcv_nxt &&
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq == tp->snd_nxt)
goto pass;
syn_challenge:
if (syn_inerr)
TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_INERRS);
@ -5889,6 +5894,7 @@ syn_challenge:
goto discard;
}
pass:
bpf_skops_parse_hdr(sk, skb);
return true;
@ -6673,6 +6679,9 @@ int tcp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
tcp_fast_path_on(tp);
if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN)
tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN);
if (sk->sk_socket)
goto consume;
break;
case TCP_FIN_WAIT1: {