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[ Upstream commit 8a021e7fa10576eeb3938328f39bbf98fe7d4715 ] This patch simplifies the verification of size arguments associated to pointer arguments to helpers and kfuncs. Many helpers take a pointer argument followed by the size of the memory access performed to be performed through that pointer. Before this patch, the handling of the size argument in check_mem_size_reg() was confusing and wasteful: if the size register's lower bound was 0, then the verification was done twice: once considering the size of the access to be the lower-bound of the respective argument, and once considering the upper bound (even if the two are the same). The upper bound checking is a super-set of the lower-bound checking(*), except: the only point of the lower-bound check is to handle the case where zero-sized-accesses are explicitly not allowed and the lower-bound is zero. This static condition is now checked explicitly, replacing a much more complex, expensive and confusing verification call to check_helper_mem_access(). Error messages change in this patch. Before, messages about illegal zero-size accesses depended on the type of the pointer and on other conditions, and sometimes the message was plain wrong: in some tests that changed you'll see that the old message was something like "R1 min value is outside of the allowed memory range", where R1 is the pointer register; the error was wrongly claiming that the pointer was bad instead of the size being bad. Other times the information that the size came for a register with a possible range of values was wrong, and the error presented the size as a fixed zero. Now the errors refer to the right register. However, the old error messages did contain useful information about the pointer register which is now lost; recovering this information was deemed not important enough. (*) Besides standing to reason that the checks for a bigger size access are a super-set of the checks for a smaller size access, I have also mechanically verified this by reading the code for all types of pointers. I could convince myself that it's true for all but PTR_TO_BTF_ID (check_ptr_to_btf_access). There, simply looking line-by-line does not immediately prove what we want. If anyone has any qualms, let me know. Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231221232225.568730-2-andreimatei1@gmail.com Stable-dep-of: 8ea607330a39 ("bpf: Fix overloading of MEM_UNINIT's meaning") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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