Instead of using copies of primitives from OpenTitan, vendor the files in directly from OpenTitan, and use them. Benefits: - Less potential for diverging code between OpenTitan and Ibex, causing problems when importing Ibex into OT. - Use of the abstract primitives instead of the generic ones. The abstract primitives are replaced during synthesis time with target-dependent implementations. For simulation, nothing changes. For synthesis for a given target technology (e.g. a specific ASIC or FPGA technology), the primitives system can be instructed to choose optimized versions (if available). This is most relevant for the icache, which hard-coded the generic SRAM primitive before. This primitive is always implemented as registers. By using the abstract primitive (prim_ram_1p) instead, the RAMs can be replaced with memory-compiler-generated ones if necessary. There are no real draw-backs, but a couple points to be aware of: - Our ram_1p and ram_2p implementations are kept as wrapper around the primitives, since their interface deviates slightly from the one in prim_ram*. This also includes a rather unfortunate naming confusion around rvalid, which means "read data valid" in the OpenTitan advanced RAM primitives (prim_ram_1p_adv for example), but means "ack" in PULP-derived IP and in our bus implementation. - The core_ibex UVM DV doesn't use FuseSoC to generate its file list, but uses a hard-coded list in `ibex_files.f` instead. Since the dynamic primitives system requires the use of FuseSoC we need to provide a stop-gap until this file is removed. Issue #893 tracks progress on that. - Dynamic primitives depend no a not-yet-merged feature of FuseSoC (https://github.com/olofk/fusesoc/pull/391). We depend on the same functionality in OpenTitan and have instructed users to use a patched branch of FuseSoC for a long time through `python-requirements.txt`, so no action is needed for users which are either successfully interacting with the OpenTitan source code, or have followed our instructions. All other users will see a reasonably descriptive error message during a FuseSoC run. - This commit is massive, but there are no good ways to split it into bisectable, yet small, chunks. I'm sorry. Reviewers can safely ignore all code in `vendor/lowrisc_ip`, it's an import from OpenTitan. - The check_tool_requirements tooling isn't easily vendor-able from OpenTitan at the moment. I've filed https://github.com/lowRISC/opentitan/issues/2309 to get that sorted. - The LFSR primitive doesn't have a own core file, forcing us to include the catch-all `lowrisc:prim:all` core. I've filed https://github.com/lowRISC/opentitan/issues/2310 to get that sorted.
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title |
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Primitive Component: PRESENT Scrambler |
Overview
prim_present
is an (unhardened) implementation of the encryption pass of the 64bit PRESENT block cipher.
It is a fully unrolled combinational implementation that supports both key lengths specified in the paper (80bit and 128bit).
Further, the number of rounds is fully configurable, and the primitive supports a 32bit block cipher flavor which is not specified in the original paper.
It should be noted, however, that reduced-round and/or 32bit versions are not secure and must not be used in a setting where cryptographic cipher strength is required. I.e., this primitive is only intended to be used as a lightweight data scrambling device.
Parameters
Name | type | Description |
---|---|---|
DataWidth | int | Block size, can be 32 or 64 |
KeyWidth | int | Key size, can be 64, 80 or 128 |
NumRounds | int | Number of PRESENT rounds, has to be greater than 0 |
Signal Interfaces
Name | In/Out | Description |
---|---|---|
data_i | input | Plaintext input |
key_i | input | Key input |
data_o | output | Output of the ciphertext |
Theory of Operations
/---------------\
| |
| PRESENT |
key_i | |
=====/======>| DataWidth |
[KeyWidth] | KeyWidth |
| NumRounds |
data_i | | data_o
=====/======>| |=====/=======>
[DataWidth] | | [DataWidth]
| |
\---------------/
The PRESENT module is fully unrolled and combinational, meaning that it does not have any clock, reset or handshaking inputs. The only inputs are the key and the plaintext, and the only output is the ciphertext.
The internal construction follows the the algorithm described in the original paper. The block size is 64bit and the key size can be either 80bit or 128bit, depending on the security requirements. In its original formulation, this cipher has 31 rounds comprised of an XOR operation with a round key, followed by the application of an s-box and a permutation layer:
round_keys = key_derivation(key_i);
state = data_i;
for (int i=1; i < 32; i++) {
state = state ^ round_keys[i];
state = sbox4_layer(state);
state = perm_layer(state);
}
data_o = state ^ round_keys[32];
The reduced 32bit block-size variant implemented is non-standard and should only be used for scrambling purposes, since it is not secure. It leverages the same crypto primitives and key derivation functions as the 64bit variant, with the difference that the permutation layer is formulated for 32 instead of 64 elements.